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THE SPATIAL AND QUALITY DIMENSIONS OF AIRBNB MARKETS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Airbnb is now present in many tourist destinations worldwide. With the pricing power in the 
hands of the individual hosts, the assessment of competition is of great relevance. Despite the 
many studies on the drivers of Airbnb prices, there is no contribution yet on how quality affects 
the spatial dimensions of Airbnb markets. We aim to fill this gap with a case study of Bristol 
(UK). Using standard regression techniques, we find a quality-moderated spatial decay in the 
price effects of competition in local Airbnb markets. Thus, the price of a given listing is affected 
negatively by other listings within a set of radii that decrease with product differentiation. 
Beyond this local market boundary, the existence of other listings may increase prices, as 
demand is driven to the neighbourhood- or city-wide markets because of the diversity of 
tourism accommodation.  
Keywords: Accommodation pricing; Airbnb; sharing economy; spatial economics.  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The tourism sector was characterized by a market structure mainly formed by tour-operator, 
air carriers, travel agencies, and hotel brands. Since the 1970s, the successive air market 
liberalizations, the advent of the internet and, more recently, the development of peer-to-peer 
(P2P) sharing economy platforms (such as Airbnb) have transformed the sector by lowering 
entry barriers and facilitating the appearance of a new supplier: private owners (Zervas et al., 
2017; or Blal et al., 2018). While Guttentag (2015) and Drogu et al. (2019) highlight the 
“disruptive” effect of sharing economy platforms in the hotel sector (particularly in the low-
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end segments of the market) (Zervas et al., 2017), other studies reduce the impact of P2P 
accommodation in hotel performance by emphasizing the different tourist profiles attracted by 
the former (Varma et al., 2016; STR, 2017). The impact can also be mitigated by the size and 
growth of the market, as well by incumbency advantages. For instance, the pricing power of 
US hoteliers has not been hit by Airbnb supply as demand has grown steadily since 1930 (STR, 
2017). Also, Eugenio-Martín (2019) found that the penetration of Airbnb listings was higher 
in cities and small towns than in sun-and-beach areas in the Canary Islands, where hotel 
establishments hold a prevailing market position occupying the better locations.  
Despite that, P2P platforms are usually regarded as unfair competition by incumbents that 
demand more oversight in terms of tax compliance and safety standards (Dickinson, 2018). 
Other areas of concern are the nuisance caused by visitors in residential areas (Gutiérrez et al., 
2017), and the increase in rents and house prices that is pushing traditional tenants out of 
neighborhoods (Wachsmuth and Weisler, 2018). Despite the effects on the hotel and residential 
sectors, the entry of new P2P platforms has facilitated the boom of private accomodation supply 
in many cities, with an ever-increasing share of the market. These platforms allow hosts to 
establish a direct link with prospective guests by showing information about their properties, 
and allowing former guests to leave comments or rank the property. The availability of such 
amount of public information boosts competition, turning product differentiation into the 
cornerstone for attracting guests. 
A key element of product differentiation is location, and its influence can be clearly seen in the 
spatial distribution on hotels and Airbnb listings in most cities worldwide, which tends to be 
concentrated in areas with better tourist attributes. As a result, ceteris paribus, prices are 
expected to be higher in these areas than in peripheral locations (Chamberlain, 1933). This 
effect has been confirmed by most studies that account for location as one of the drivers of 
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Airbnb prices (e.g. Wang and Nicolau, 2017; Magno et al., 2018; Önder et al., 2018; or Lorde 
et al., 2019). From studies on hotel prices, we also know another key aspect of location as a 
driver of price: the influence of competitors decays with distance and thus markets can be 
defined according to a geographical boundary (Lee, 2015). However, the distance relationship 
is moderated by quality differentiation, with competing hotels of similar quality exerting an 
influence over longer distances (Balaguer and Pernías, 2013; Lee, 2015; Soler and Gemar, 
2018) so different market boundaries may exist. In view of that, it seems reasonable that Airbnb 
markets could also be defined from both spatial and quality dimensions, with the second having 
an impact on the first. Thus, we should be able to find different radii around a given listing 
within which the presence of competitors of varying levels of quality has an influence on its 
price. Despite the many contributions in the area, there is no study to date that provides an 
estimate of the geographical scope of Airbnb markets that considers quality differences.  
This paper explores the role of location and competitor prices (proxy for quality) as drivers of 
the price of Airbnb listings in the city of Bristol, UK. To this end, we estimate a series of 
hedonic price equations using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods. The goal is to arrive at 
an optimal market definition (or definitions) in terms of distance and price difference among 
competing listings. The results can have implications for Airbnb hosts at the time of assessing 
their local level of competition: either a fixed-radii around the property or a city-wide approach 
may be misleading, with the real market definition lying somewhere in between (different radii 
based on quality differences). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review of 
Airbnb price determinants and the spatial dimensions of local accommodation markets. Section 
3 presents the Bristol case study, covers the process of data collection and processing, as well 
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as the OLS regression approach. Section 4 presents the results and discusses their main 
implications. Section 5 concludes with a summary of the main findings. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Non-location price determinants 
The relatively fixed capacity and perishable nature of the accommodation product makes price 
the main strategic variable in this sector (Yelkur and Dacosta, 2001). The broad literature on 
hotel room prices has employed regression methods to test the relevance of different categories 
of price determinants, such as 1) room characteristics and other amenities: room size, room 
service, internet access, LED TV, or having a fitness centre (Schamel, 2012; Chen and 
Rothschild, 2010); and 2) quality signals, such as the hotel star rating, being part of a branded 
chain, or online customer reviews (Becerra et al., 2013; Masiero et al., 2015; Schamel, 2012; 
Yang et al., 2016). 
With pricing in the hands of the individual hosts, the question of which factors drive Airbnb 
rates has also received substantial attention in the recent literature. These studies employ a 
broader choice of price determinants than those in the hotel sector. All studies include variables 
related to room or property characteristics, such as the number of beds, bedrooms, or 
bathrooms, some or all of which have been found to be statistically significant drivers of price 
(e.g. Chen and Xie, 2017; Gibbs et al, 2018; Günter and Önder, 2018; Lorde el al., 2019). The 
characteristics of the host are common predictors as well, with studies focusing on reputation 
or “superhost” status (Chen and Xie, 2017; Magno et al., 2018) as well as on the positive impact 
of responsiveness (Günter and Önder, 2018), experience (Zhang et al., 2017), and multiple 
listings (Önder et al., 2018). According to Tussyadiah and Pesonen (2016) and Guttentag 
(2015), having direct contact with the host enriches the local experience of the clients, while 
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Ert et al. (2016) conclude that posting attractive photos of the property is more important that 
having high online ratings as a host. It was also found that hosts with multiple listings can 
better implement dynamic pricing (adjusting price according to seasonal demand fluctuations), 
leading to superior price positioning and revenue performance (Magno et al., 2018; Kwok and 
Xie, 2019). A third category of price drivers refers to rental rules, such as the check-in window 
(Lawani et al., 2019). Fourth, we can mention customer feedback, as prices can be influenced 
by customer reviews and ratings (Lawani et al., 2019; Kwok and Xie, 2019). 
While all the variables above can be considered relevant drivers of demand for Airbnb 
properties, most studies on price determinants in the accommodation sector also recognize the 
pre-eminent role that location plays in influencing travellers’ choices (Bull, 1994). 
2.2 Location price determinants 
The importance of location in hotel pricing is related to the fact that the proximity to tourism 
resources (such as tourism attractions, bus/train/metro stations, or even the airport) is a key 
differentiating characteristic of accommodation supply (see e.g. Urtasun & Gutierrez, 2006; 
Rigall-i-Torrent et al., 2011; Lee & Jang, 2012; Gutiérrez, et al, 2017; Benitez-Aurioles, 2018; 
or Gunter and Önder, 2018). The most commonly used location characteristic in hotel studies 
is proximity to city centre (or centres), which is generally expected to push prices up (Soler 
and Gemar, 2018). For example, Gutiérrez et al. (2017) and Benitez-Aurioles (2017) found that 
each additional kilometer of distance to the city center implies a 0.704% and 0.165% decrease 
in hotel prices in Barcelona and Madrid, respectively.  
Most studies on Airbnb prices also include a measurement of distance to city centre (Günter 
and Önder, 2018). However, it is also common to evaluate proximity to alternative places, such 
as convention centres (Kwok and Xie, 2019), bus/train stations (Magno et al., 2018), coastline 
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(Perez-Sanchez et al., 2018) and/or other points of interest such as sightseeing, nightlife, 
shopping or eating hotspots (Magno et al., 2018; Perez-Sanchez et al., 2018). Indeed, Boros et 
al. (2018) and Dudás et al. (2017) noted how most of the Airbnb supply in Budapest is 
concentrated in few districts of the city center where prices vary according to the proximity to 
tourist attractions.  
While a central location is usually an advantage for hotels and Airbnb hosts, Chen and 
Rothschild (2010) found the opposite effect in the Taipei market which the authors associate 
to increased competition. Thus, location can be a double-edged sword and well-situated 
accomodation providers may face severe constraints in their pricing power (Chung and 
Kalnins, 2001) that can even affect their ablity to survive (Baum and Mezias, 1992). 
2.3 Spatial competition and market definition 
In line with the idea of location being a key aspect of product differentiation in this sector, it is 
not surprising that competition occurs at a spatial level. This has important implications at the 
time of defining the relevant market for a given accomodation provider. Market definition can 
be linked to the concept of demand substitutability, which can have both product and spatial 
dimensions (Martin, 2010). The spatial element is brought in by recognizing that the influence 
of competitors decays with distance (due to e.g. transportation costs) until it disappears at the 
market boundary. Furthermore, past authors have also noted that the effect of distance on price 
competition is moderated by quality. In fact, quality can be an effective mechanism to limit 
competition among well-located lodgings, thus resulting in higher prices (Becerra et al., 2013; 
and Soler and Gemar, 2018). These results can be understood as an effort by hotel managers to 
escape from the damaging effects of aggressive price competition under a high degree of 
product homogeneity and excess capacity, as predicted by the well-known Bertrand oligopoly 
model (Lee, 2015). Thus, price competition can be mitigated by vertical differentiation (Shaked 
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and Sutton, 1982) and, in the accomodation sector, it has been shown that hotels of higher 
quality have a lower price sensitivity to the presence of neighboring competitors (Balaguer and 
Pernías, 2013; Becerra et al., 2013; and Lee, 2015). Quality-moderated spatial competition can 
also occur between traditional accommodation services (e.g. hotels) and Airbnb listings, with 
past studies including average hotel prices as a driver of Airbnb prices (Önder et al., 2018; 
Magno et al., 2018).  
In regards to the sign of the price effects of competition, the general finding in the 
accommodation sector is that a higher market supply has a negative impact on prices (Becerra 
et al., 2013; Önder et al., 2018; Lee, 2015; Balaguer and Pernías, 2013). However, when 
analysing the price effects amongst competing Airbnbs, Lawani et al., (2019) found some 
degree of price complementarity, with evidence of spillover effects across listings in the same 
area. This is a sign of agglomeration externalities that have also been documented in the past 
for the hotel sector (Baum and Haveman, 1997). The existence of neighbouring competitors 
can have a positive impact on prices as more visitors are drawn to the area, with Urtasun and 
Gutiérrez (2006) showing that the differentiated hotels are the ones for which the positive 
spillover effects offset the downward pressure of prices brought by competition. An alternative 
explanation for this price complementarity is that, in the absence of strong differentiation, tacit 
cooperation, rather than competition, could become the main driver of market behaviour (Gan 
and Hernández, 2013).  
In this context of complex spatial competition, the literature on Airbnb prices is still to provide 
an estimate of the geographical scope of local Airbnb markets that is moderated by quality 
differences. Such estimates exist for hotel markets. For example, Lee (2015) regressed hotel 
prices against the price of competitors measured at varying levels of distance (10 and 20 miles) 
and quality. The results indicate that competing hotels of similar quality still exert a significant 
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impact on price at a distance of 20 miles, while the influence of hotels of different quality is 
only statistically significant at 10 miles. A similar approach was employed by Balaguer and 
Pernías (2013), who defined three distance radii around hotels (200, 400, and 600 meters) and 
considered quality differentiation according to star category. They also concluded that the 
effect of the number of competitors on hotel prices is moderated by quality differentiation and 
spatial distance.   
In Airbnb studies, there are a few implicit examples of geographical market definition. Xie and 
Kwok (2017) assumed that hotel prices were affected by the number of city-wide Airbnb 
listings, as well as the prices of listings within the same postal code. More recently, Eugenio-
Martin et al. (2019) published a paper on the determinants of Airbnb location in the Canary 
Islands. Their implicit market definition is based on a radius of 7 km around Airbnb locations 
because it maximized spatial autocorrelation. However, neither of these two geographical 
references consider that the competitive pressure that Airbnb listings exert among themselves 
(and hotels) is affected by product differentiation. The same applies to the more local estimate 
(650 m) provided by Önder et al. (2018), which is the closest reference to our study. They 
estimated an optimal radius of 650 m in Vienna for hotel prices (regardless of category) to exert 
a significant influence on Airbnb prices. This was done by estimating a large number of price 
regressions with different distance radii and choosing the best model based on goodness-of-fit 
indicators (e.g. adjusted R-square). We aim to improve on their optimization method with the 
introduction of a quality dimension in similar fashion than past hotel studies. The combination 
of these two past approaches is at the core of our methodological contribution.  A second novel 
aspect is that all studies in this area are centered around the competition between hotels and 
Airbnb but there is still a research gap in investigating the impact that Airbnb listings exert 
amongst themselves under different levels of distance and quality differences. 
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Case study and datasets  
As one of the largest cities in the United Kingdom, Bristol is also one of the country’s top 
tourist destinations. This has prompted the fast development of sharing economy platforms in 
the short-term property rental market that primarily target tourists and other visitors to the city. 
The most popular of those platforms is Airbnb, whose presence in the city can be traced back 
to 2011 (the date of the oldest extant listing). This has brought increased level of competition 
to the traditional tourism accommodation sector, and hotel companies have been very vocal 
about what they consider to be unfair competition that is not bound to the same tax regulations 
or safety standards (ITV, 2018). Airbnb usually responds by noting the positive impact on 
visitor arrivals to Bristol as a consequence of the expanded accommodation supply, as well as 
the fact that the use of peer-to-peer platforms enables locals (as hosts) to capture a higher 
portion of the benefits associated to tourism activity in detriment of international hotel chains. 
The supply of private properties in Airbnb and similar platforms has grown considerably since 
launch because short-term tourism rentals are usually more profitable than medium- or long-
term residential contracts. Furthermore, Airbnb allows hosts to set their own prices and they 
retain the proceeds minus a fee. 
We obtained a dataset with all Airbnb listings in Bristol dated April 14th, 2018. This data has 
been web-scraped and made freely available in www.insideairbnb.com. Past studies on Airbnb 
prices (e.g. Wang and Nicolau, 2017) have used this data. The file contains information on 
2,056 listings featuring a wide variety of property and room types. For the purposes of this 
paper, we focus only on entire properties (as opposed to private or share rooms), since our 
exploratory analysis reveals that the prices for the latter are not sufficiently explained by the 
traditional determinants in the tourism accommodation sector. We also focus on the most 
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common types of properties (Apartments and Houses). This leads to a subsample of 818 
listings, which represent 39.8% of Bristol’s Airbnb supply. The spatial distribution of our 
dataset is shown in Figure 1. The city centre concentrates most of the 534 apartments, while 
the 234 houses appear in different clusters around the city. In line with the past literature, we 
selected a number of variables from the raw dataset that relate to room prices, host 
characteristics, room features, and customer feedback. In addition, due to the well-documented 
link between Airbnb and the housing market (See e.g. Wachsmuth and Weisler, 2018) we also 
compiled information from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) about house values using 
the mean price paid for all houses sold in Bristol within the year ending June 2018. This data 
is available for the 55 Middle layer Super Output Areas (MSOA) defined in the City of Bristol1. 
House values act as a control variable that is expected to capture additional characteristics of 
the areas in which the listings are located that can affect short-term rental prices. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Our dataset is completed with location factors for each individual listing, such as the distance 
to the Bristol city center (located in the “Bristol Castle”), as well as the distance to the nearest 
bus/train station. However, for the purposes of this paper, the most important location factors 
will have a variable radius around the listing (as in Önder et al., 2018): 1) the number of tourism 
attractions, 2) the average hotel price per person, and 3) the number of competing Airbnb 
listings of the same property type. All geospatial analysis was carried out in ArcGIS, and 
distances are computed “as the crow flies”, based on the latitude and longitude of the listings, 
which is the same approach used by past authors. The location of all tourism attractions in 
                                                 
1 This was sourced from the House Price Statistics for Small Areas (HPSSAs) dataset provided by the ONS. 
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Bristol was sourced from openstreetmap.com and the hotel data (location and prices) was 
scraped from the online platforms hotels.com and booking.com for the month of April 2019. 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to explore the spatial and quality dimensions of local Airbnb markets, we estimated a 
series of price equations using ordinary least squares (OLS) methods. The equations aim to 
explain the price of the individual listings in relation to the characteristics of the property and 
the host, local home values, and proximity to tourism attractions, hotels, and other listings. 
Each model will differ in relation to the proximity variables, which are measured with 
increasing distance radius and quality margin (measured as a price difference). The main 
conclusions of our paper will be derived from the analysis of our goodness-of-fit coefficient 
(adjusted R-square), as well as the values and signs of the proximity variables across all models. 
The basic specification is log-linear and is shown in Equation 1. We use a similar set of 
variables than the paper by Önder et al. (2018) with the addition of house values. 
(1) 𝑙 𝑛(𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑏𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑂𝐼𝑆_𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠𝑖 +
𝛽9𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒_ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙_𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠 + 𝛽10𝑛_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝_𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑢𝑠_𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 
Where β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated and ε is the usual random error. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the listing price of the i-th property (listing 
pricei). The log-linear specification was chosen because it delivered a significantly higher 
goodness-of-fit. Alternative dependent variables, such as the price per guest were also explored 
but discarded due to worse performance. The number of bedrooms and bathrooms have been 
well established as drivers of price by past studies, as well as the average user rating of the 
property or the host having a “superhost” status. The house_value variable indicates the mean 
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price paid for all houses sold in the MSOA that corresponds to the relevant listing. Then, we 
also included the distance to city center (distcenter) and to the nearest bus/train station 
(diststation), both measured in km.  
POIS_radius refers to the number of points of interest (tourism attractions) within a given 
radius of the listing. We employ 34 different radii: between 350m and 2,000m in 50m steps. 
This range of distances is chosen as it includes the 650m reference, which is the optimal radius 
suggested by Önder et al. (2018), while also covering from an extremely local market definition 
to an (almost) city-wide level. Price_hotel_radius refers to the average hotel price (for a 
double-room) within a given radius. The strong spatial concentration of hotels in Bristol and 
the lack of direct comparability between hotel and Airbnb prices does not allow us to introduce 
quality differentiation in this variable. N_comp_radius_diff refers to the number of competing 
Airbnb listings of the same property type, within the same distance radii as defined above, and 
within a predetermined price difference (as a proxy for quality difference), expressed in 
percentage above and below the left-hand-side listing price. We consider ten price margins, 
from 10% to 100% in 10% steps. In total, the combination of distance radii and price margins 
leads to 340 OLS equations, which are estimated using STATA. 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of the selected variables, with the proximity factors 
(POIS, price_hotel, and n_comp) combining data from all radii and price differences. Listing 
prices vary between 15 and 800 GBP per night and properties range between 1 and 7 
bathrooms, which gives an idea of the great diversity of tourism accommodation available in a 
city like Bristol. Depending on the property’s location and distance radius considered it can 
face a minimum of 1 competitor up to 629 listings in its local market. Table 2 shows the 
pairwise linear correlation coefficients between the chosen variables. Despite high correlations 
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between the distance variables, the analysis of the variance inflations factors2 (VIF) post-
estimation allows us to discard any problems associated with multicollinearity in the 
specifications. Due to the presence of heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors were 
employed. 
[Insert Table 1] 
[Insert Table 2] 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The adjusted r-squared coefficients across all estimated models are shown in Appendix A 
(Table A1). The best-fitting models for each level of price difference (highlighted in bold) 
indicate that the optimal market definition has a smaller radius when the heterogeneity among 
listings increases. For example, the existence of other listings up to a 10% price difference is 
the best predictor of a given listing’s price when the competitors within a 1,700 m radius are 
considered. If the maximum allowable price difference is expanded to 20%, 30%, and 40%, 
the optimal radius for market definition is 1,050 m, 900 m, and 600 m, respectively. While the 
analysis of confidence intervals for the adjusted r-square coefficients does not allow us to 
establish that these models are statistically superior to the other specifications, we can conclude 
(similarly to Önder et al., 2018) that these are the “optimal” (i.e. best-fitting) spatial and 
price/quality dimensions of local Airbnb markets in Bristol.  
Moreover, for the models above 60% in price difference, adjusted r-squared values increase 
with distance up to the 2,000 m radius, which is the limit of our calculations. This second trend 
                                                 
2 VIF=1/(1-R2), where R2 refers to the R-squared coefficient of the linear regression of a given explanatory 
variable against all other predictors. 
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suggests that there could be two ways in which Airbnb markets can be defined: a local market 
with decreasing radii, and a city-wide market with a longer radius.  
Table 3 shows the OLS regression results for the optimal “local” model (i.e. highest adjusted 
r-square) with a distance radius of 1,700 m and 10% price difference. The estimated 
coefficients indicate that the number of bedrooms and bathrooms are both key drivers of price, 
thus agreeing with most past studies, such as, e.g. Chen and Xie (2017). The rating and 
superhost coefficients have a positive sign, which agrees with Wang and Nicolau (2017), and 
Önder et al. (2018). The negative sign of the distance to city center is consistent with the view 
that accessibility affects price (Gibbs et al., 2018) but the coefficient (alongside the distance-
to-station one) is far from statistical significance at 5% level. A possible reason for the lack of 
significance is the presence of the points of interest (POIs) variable, which is positive and 
significant, and already captures the impact of accessibility to tourism attractions on Airbnb 
prices. The number of local competitors has a negative and significant impact on listing prices, 
which agrees with the well-established notion that increased supply bring prices down due to 
stronger competition among local hosts (Lee, 2015). The average price of the local hotels has 
a positive coefficient yet not significant at 5% level. This links well with economic theory, as 
prices are usually considered strategic complements in oligopolistic settings (Martin, 2010). 
On one hand, this can be interpreted as a sign that an increase in the average price of hotels in 
the local area can be an opportunity for hosts to increase prices as well (spillover effects). On 
the other hand, a positive price correlation can also signal direct competition (Davis and 
Garcés, 2009). Any aggressive pricing strategies by nearby hotels are likely to decrease prices 
and profitability for Airbnb listings within the local area, as they are forced react by decreasing 
their prices as well. This is the behavior that one would normally expect from Bertrand 
oligopolies operating under excess capacity.  
15 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
The central estimates for the “number of competitors” variable are shown in Table A2 
(Appendix A), with the significant coefficients (at 5% level) highlighted in bold. This table 
confirms the interpretation from Table A1 about the two different markets. Results show that, 
with 95% confidence, the price of any given listing is affected negatively by the presence of 
other listings within a maximum 40% price difference. In these local markets, price competition 
is strong and exerts a downward pressure in prices. Figure 2 presents that information 
graphically in order to illustrate the quality-moderated spatial decay of the competitive effects 
among Airbnb listings, as predicted by past studies in the accommodation sector (Lee, 2015). 
The higher the level of product homogeneity, the stronger the substitutability between listings 
and, in turn, the negative impact on prices, which translates into a larger market boundary. 
Beyond these levels of quality differentiation, however, the neighbourhood- or city-wide 
agglomeration effects take over. In fact, for price differences of 70% of above, the presence of 
other listings affects prices positively, which agrees with Lawani et al. (2019)’s finding of price 
spillovers. Furthermore, the strength of this impact decreases with distance, which supports the 
existence of agglomeration effects at a neighbourhood level as well, because demand is driven 
to the areas with high diversity of tourism accommodation. Statistically significant 
agglomeration effects also appear at a city-wide level but are much weaker than in the local 
market as they decrease with market radius.  
[Insert Figure 2] 
These results have few implications for Airbnb hosts. Given the agglomeration effects and 
price spillovers at a city and neighbourhood levels, hosts should be aware that any policies that 
restrict the overall supply of accommodation (e.g. limiting annual availability) can have a 
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negative impact on their prices, particularly if their own local supply conditions are affected. 
Furthermore, hosts should also be aware of their local competition within the spatial and 
quality/price boundaries set in this paper. Given the wide availability of open data in relation 
to Airbnb supply, quantifying the number of competing listings should be relatively 
straightforward. In a context of oligopolistic price competition, the main threat would be new 
properties with unrestricted availability. In order to prevent falling into a Bertrand trap, hosts 
are advised to invest in further differentiation of their properties. 
5. SUMMARY 
This paper aims to give insights on the spatial and quality/price dimensions of Airbnb markets 
using a case study of 818 entire houses and apartment listings from Bristol (United Kingdom). 
With this data, we carry out at set of 340 regression models in which the location of the listing 
and its proximity to competitors are specified as drivers of price, but the radius and price 
margins to assess competition are variable within a range of 350 to 2,000 m and 10% to 100% 
price difference (as a proxy for quality differences), respectively. 
The results indicate that the number of bedrooms and bathrooms is a key driver of price, as 
well as its proximity to tourism attractions. Evaluating the results across all estimated models, 
we see that the relevant “local” market is best defined with a set of radii that decrease with the 
level of price differentiation: an optimal radius of 1,700 m, 1,050 m, 900 m, and 600 m 
corresponds to a price difference 10%, 20%, 30%, and 40%, respectively. Within these 
boundaries, the presence of competing Airbnb listings exerts a negative impact on prices. For 
higher levels of quality differentiation, however, the proximity of competitors has a positive 
impact on prices, which can be clearly interpreted as an agglomeration effect both at 
neighbourhood and city-wide levels. These results hint at the existence of two alternative 
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market definitions: the local market (with price competition and strong agglomeration effects, 
depending on quality differentiation) and the city market (with weaker agglomeration effects). 
In a context of concern from public authorities in the UK about the potential impact that short-
term accommodation rentals can have on local residential markets, hosts should be aware of 
any city-wide trends and policies that can restrict the overall accommodation supply because 
that can have a strong negative impact on their prices. Furthermore, hosts should be aware of 
their local competition within the spatial and quality/price boundaries set in this paper, 
particularly from those properties with unrestricted availability, which are more likely to 
compete aggressively in prices. 
The conclusions from our paper should be taken with caution since the results from a city like 
Bristol cannot be immediately generalized to other major tourist destinations in the UK or other 
countries. Also, since we only have the listed price at the time of data collection (April), there 
is a lack of information on dynamic pricing strategies potentially employed by the hosts that 
would have made the analysis more detailed. Any potential seasonal variations in the spatial or 
price dimensions of Airbnb local markets have not been captured either. Further research can 
address these issues when more time-series data becomes available. Expanding this analysis to 
other cities can serve to validate these conclusions beyond the geographical and temporal 
boundaries imposed by our data. 
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Figure 1. Sample dataset of Airbnb listings. Source: www.insideairbnb.com 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the selected variables 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
listing_price GBP 101.00 75.09 15.00 800.00 
house_value GBP 337,567 96,909 193,779 585,826 
bedrooms  1.83 1.15 1.00 7.00 
baths  1.31 0.59 1.00 5.00 
rating % 79.72 35.05 0.00 100.00 
diststation km 1.28 1.06 0.04 6.31 
superhost  0.25 0.44 0.00 1.00 
distcenter km 1.91 1.25 0.07 7.13 
POIS  90.14 90.92 0.00 498.00 
price_hotel GBP 68.16 62.50 53.00 242.00 
n_comp   107.23 85.65 1.00 629.00 
Note: The statistics of POIS, price_hotel, price_comp and n_comp combine the data for all radii and price differences. Sources: 
www.insideairbnb.com, www.openstreetmap.com, Own Elaboration. 
 
Table 2. Pairwise linear correlation between the selected variables 
  
house_value bed 
rooms 
baths rating 
dist_ 
station 
super 
host 
dist_ 
center 
POIS  
 
price_ 
hotel 
n_ 
comp 
house_value 1.000          
bedrooms 0.133 1.000         
baths 0.140 0.636 1.000        
rating 0.069 -0.077 -0.022 1.000       
dist_station -0.097 0.054 0.000 -0.051 1.000      
superhost 0.110 -0.002 0.057 0.240 0.024 1.000     
dist_center 0.095 0.213 0.072 -0.059 0.759 0.033 1.000    
POIS_450m -0.070 -0.239 -0.023 0.015 -0.297 0.002 -0.631 1.000   
price_hotel_450m 0.073 -0.264 -0.090 -0.005 -0.205 0.032 -0.433 0.638 1.000  
n_comp_450m_10% -0.019 -0.347 -0.246 0.075 -0.270 0.044 -0.465 0.532 0.443 1.000 
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Table 3. OLS coefficients for the best-fitting market definition (1,700 meters and 10% price difference). 
  Coef. s.d. Prob. VIF 
house_value 0.0000 0.0000 0.2160 1.36 
bedrooms 0.1957 0.0172 0.0000 1.95 
baths 0.2029 0.0296 0.0000 1.80 
rating 0.0002 0.0004 0.6580 1.08 
dist_station 0.0011 0.0188 0.9540 2.99 
superhost 0.0912 0.0239 0.0000 1.10 
dist_center -0.0092 0.0227 0.6850 5.48 
POIS_450m 0.0014 0.0002 0.0000 2.77 
price_hotel_450m 0.0002 0.0002 0.2690 1.68 
n_comp_450m_10% -0.0026 0.0005 0.0000 1.94 
constant 3.7195 0.0832 0.0000 - 
No. of obs. 818 Adjusted R-squared 0.5485  
 
 
Figure 2. Quality-moderated spatial decay for the price impact of competition in local Airbnb markets 
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Appendix A. Estimation results 
 
Table A1. Adjusted R-squared (left) and competing Airbnb price (right) coefficients for all models 
 
Adj-R2 Price difference from listing (%) 
  10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
D
is
ta
n
ce
 r
a
d
iu
s 
fr
o
m
 l
is
ti
n
g
 (
m
) 
350 0.538 0.538 0.534 0.531 0.528 0.528 0.531 0.537 0.541 0.543 
400 0.539 0.539 0.534 0.532 0.529 0.529 0.534 0.540 0.548 0.550 
450 0.543 0.541 0.537 0.535 0.531 0.531 0.536 0.543 0.551 0.553 
500 0.542 0.540 0.536 0.534 0.531 0.531 0.537 0.545 0.555 0.557 
550 0.543 0.541 0.537 0.535 0.531 0.532 0.538 0.546 0.556 0.558 
600 0.545 0.542 0.538 0.535 0.531 0.532 0.539 0.548 0.558 0.561 
650 0.545 0.542 0.537 0.534 0.530 0.531 0.539 0.549 0.560 0.563 
700 0.542 0.540 0.535 0.532 0.528 0.530 0.538 0.550 0.562 0.565 
750 0.543 0.540 0.535 0.532 0.528 0.530 0.539 0.550 0.563 0.567 
800 0.543 0.542 0.536 0.533 0.528 0.529 0.537 0.548 0.561 0.564 
850 0.545 0.542 0.537 0.533 0.528 0.529 0.537 0.549 0.562 0.566 
900 0.547 0.544 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.536 0.548 0.561 0.564 
950 0.547 0.544 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.535 0.547 0.561 0.564 
1,000 0.548 0.544 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.535 0.547 0.561 0.564 
1,050 0.548 0.544 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.536 0.548 0.562 0.565 
1,100 0.548 0.544 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.536 0.549 0.563 0.566 
1,150 0.547 0.544 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.536 0.549 0.563 0.566 
1,200 0.548 0.543 0.538 0.533 0.528 0.528 0.537 0.551 0.564 0.568 
1,250 0.547 0.543 0.538 0.533 0.528 0.528 0.537 0.551 0.565 0.569 
1,300 0.547 0.543 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.537 0.551 0.564 0.568 
1,350 0.547 0.543 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.537 0.551 0.564 0.567 
1,400 0.547 0.543 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.537 0.551 0.565 0.568 
1,450 0.548 0.543 0.538 0.534 0.528 0.528 0.537 0.552 0.566 0.569 
1,500 0.548 0.543 0.538 0.533 0.528 0.528 0.537 0.553 0.568 0.571 
1,550 0.548 0.543 0.537 0.533 0.527 0.528 0.538 0.554 0.569 0.573 
1,600 0.548 0.543 0.537 0.533 0.527 0.528 0.538 0.555 0.571 0.575 
1,650 0.548 0.543 0.537 0.533 0.527 0.528 0.539 0.556 0.573 0.577 
1,700 0.548 0.543 0.537 0.533 0.527 0.528 0.539 0.557 0.576 0.580 
1,750 0.548 0.543 0.537 0.533 0.527 0.529 0.540 0.558 0.577 0.582 
1,800 0.547 0.542 0.537 0.532 0.527 0.529 0.541 0.560 0.580 0.585 
1,850 0.547 0.542 0.536 0.532 0.527 0.529 0.541 0.561 0.582 0.587 
1,900 0.546 0.541 0.536 0.532 0.527 0.530 0.542 0.563 0.584 0.590 
1,950 0.546 0.541 0.536 0.531 0.527 0.530 0.543 0.564 0.586 0.593 
2,000 0.545 0.541 0.535 0.531 0.527 0.530 0.543 0.566 0.590 0.596 
Note: Bold denotes best-fitting model per column.  
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Table A2. Estimated coefficients of the number of competitors for all models 
 
n-comp Price difference from listing (%) 
  10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
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 (
m
) 
350 -0.014 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.007 
400 -0.013 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.007 
450 -0.012 -0.007 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006 
500 -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 
550 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 
600 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.005 
650 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 
700 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005 
750 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 
800 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 
850 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 
900 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 
950 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
1,000 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
1,050 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
1,100 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 
1,150 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
1,200 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
1,250 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
1,300 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,350 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,400 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,450 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,500 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,550 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,600 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,650 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,700 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,750 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,800 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,850 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,900 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
1,950 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
2,000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Note: Bold denotes statistically significant coefficient at 5% level. 
 
 
 
